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The Question of Diversity in Aotearoa/ New Zealand 
Henk Huijser, Lecturer Learning Enhancement (Communication), Learning and Teaching Support Unit 
(LTSU), University of Southern Queensland, Australia 
Abstract 
Historically, New Zealand has always represented itself as a bicultural nation of Maori (indigenous peoples) 
and Pakeha (white settlers), and this is reflected in its national cinema. But since the introduction of the 
Immigration Act 1987, New Zealand has increasingly become a multicultural and globally networked nation. 
However, this is rarely reflected in its national cinema, which largely continues to operate within a bicultural 
framework. Given this historical context, this paper explores the tension between what is called the ‘Maori 
Cultural Renaissance’ since the 1970s on the one hand, and the increasing demands for inclusion of various 
migrant communities on the other, in relation to the dominant Pakeha culture, using New Zealand cinema as a 
case study. The combination of a very small population (4 million), a relatively remote location, and advanced 
economic liberalisation means that producing a national cinema is always going to be a struggle in the face of 
global competition. The majority of films produced in New Zealand are therefore heavily reliant on government 
support. This in turn means that funding decisions are often based on official versions of nationhood and 
national identity, and the institutions responsible for these decisions are dominated by Pakeha. This paper 
discusses the impact of this situation on the content of New Zealand cinema, and the ways in which debates 
about multiculturalism and biculturalism are framed in this context, before drawing some conclusions about its 
wider impact on how the nation imagines itself and projects itself globally.  
Keywords: Multiculturalism and Biculturalism, Migration and Indigeneity, National and Cultural Identity, New 
Zealand Cinema 
Introduction 
Historically, New Zealand has always represented 
itself as a bicultural nation of Maori (the indigenous 
population) and Pakeha (white, but more 
specifically British, settlers), and this is reflected in 
its cinema as well as its wider media environment. 
The New Zealand context is characterised by a 
number of factors that inform this bicultural 
emphasis, setting it apart from other postcolonial 
settler societies such as Australia and Canada. 
During the 1970s and 80s, two main factors came 
to play a major role in the way the nation imagines 
itself: the ‘Maori Cultural Renaissance’ and 
fundamental changes in its immigration policy. The 
former was initially spearheaded by some very 
vocal protests and demands about land rights and 
ownership, which eventually forced a ‘full’ 
recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi as the 
founding document of the nation in the late 1980s. 
This set the Treaty settlement claims process in 
motion, which is ongoing. Although the emphasis 
of this process is on land, it does move significantly 
beyond the concept of land as property in a Western 
sense; integral to the indigenous understanding of 
land is what that land represents in cultural and 
spiritual terms, and it is thus often about collective 
ownership. So Treaty claims are increasingly also 
about ownership of, and access to, the airwaves for 
example, which can be seen as an extension of the 
right to self-expression and the right to be 
understood.  
When applied to New Zealand cinema as a case 
study, this process can be seen to have a major 
influence on various cultural funding institutions, 
including the New Zealand Film Commission, which 
plays a vital role in New Zealand cinema. The 
combination of a very small population of just 4 
million (and therefore a very small domestic market), 
a relatively remote location, and advanced economic 
liberalisation means that producing a national cinema 
is always going to be a struggle in the face of global 
competition. Given this situation, the majority of 
films produced in New Zealand heavily rely on 
government support, as very few of them will recoup 
their production costs, let alone make a profit. 
The second major influence on the New Zealand 
context was the change in immigration policy in the 
1980s. The 1987 Immigration Act significantly 
widened the focus of attracting migrants, which had 
until then effectively been a ‘whites only’ policy, 
although not officially (Bartley, 2004). The source 
nations became largely insignificant as the emphasis 
shifted to a combination of skilled and wealthy 
‘business’ migrants, which in New Zealand’s case 
meant a shift in immigration source nations to 
predominantly Asian nations. This had a considerable 
and rapid impact on a nation of less than 4 million 
people. In other words, New Zealand has become a 
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multicultural and globally networked society in a 
relatively short space of time. 
These two factors combined create a persistent 
tension between biculturalism and multiculturalism 
in debates about nationhood and national identity, 
which consequently informs the ways in which 
nationhood is negotiated and represented in a New 
Zealand context. This paper explores the ways in 
which these debates are framed discursively, using 
New Zealand cinema as a case study to illustrate 
the everyday consequences of these debates. 
The concept of ‘culture’ is stubbornly ambiguous 
and slippery in contemporary discourses, both in 
relation to constructions of nationhood and of race 
and ethnicity. It is precisely this ambiguity which 
makes it an attractive concept to appropriate in a 
variety of contexts and as part of a wide range of 
political discourses. For this also makes it a highly 
flexible concept. It is hardly surprising then that the 
concept of multiculturalism, with its prominent 
‘culture’ component, is similarly and frequently 
appropriated for different strategic reasons, often in 
equally vague terms, to the point where it became a 
90s ‘buzzword’ within social-cultural debate.   
As Bennett observes, ‘multiculturalism has served 
variously as code for assimilationism and cultural 
separatism; campus marxism and ethnic 
nationalism; transnational corporate marketing 
strategies and minority competition for state 
resources; radical democracy and cosmetic 
adjustments to the liberal-democratic status-quo’ 
(1998, p.1/2). It consequently has a close 
relationship with that other ‘buzzword’: 
globalisation. ‘Multiculturalism is in many ways an 
epiphenomenon of globalisation. (.) The word itself 
has had a diasporic career, entering and inflecting 
numerous national debates about the politics of 
cultural difference, the “limits of tolerance”, and 
the future of the nation-state’ (ibid, p.2). These 
different debates relate to different aspects of 
globalisation which can be roughly divided 
between economic discourses and cultural 
discourses. The former are concerned with 
competition for skilled labour on a global scale, 
while the latter relate to debates about for example 
national and cultural identity. 
In a New Zealand context, multiculturalism has a 
particularly uneasy relationship with biculturalism, 
with the latter often being privileged in official 
versions of nationhood.  
Biculturalism vs Multiculturalism: 
Positions and Contradictions 
The discourse of multiculturalism (and to a lesser 
extent biculturalism) allows for diversity, but often 
in a narrow definition of that word. The underlying 
principle is still homogeneity in the name of the 
nation, this time in terms of values and ideals. As 
Goldberg notes, ‘the fact of great heterogeneity, 
where it is acknowledged at all, is taken to necessitate 
the aspiration to a set of unifying, homogenizing 
ideals’ (1994, p.20). 
Keeping this ‘aspiration’ factor in mind, a crucial 
distinction can be drawn between multiculturalism as 
a lived reality, and multiculturalism as a state policy. 
Stratton talks in this respect about the difference 
between everyday multiculturalism, ‘the mixing, 
merging and reworking of cultural forms in people’s 
everyday lives’ (1998, p.34), and official 
multiculturalism. This is an important distinction: 
everyday multiculturalism relates to hybridity and a 
potential third space, whereas official 
multiculturalism (or biculturalism) tends to fix 
cultural identities as a kind of ‘mosaic’. Official 
multiculturalism has this ‘fixing’ effect because of its 
need to define cultural identity. As Stratton & Ang 
rightly argue, 
The problem with official multiculturalism is that it 
tends, precisely, to freeze the fluidity of identity by 
the very fact that it is concerned with synthesising 
unruly and unpredictable cultural identities and 
differences into a harmonious unity-in-diversity. So 
the metaphor of the mosaic, of unity-in-diversity, is 
based on another kind of disavowal, on a suppression 
of the potential incommensurability of juxtaposed 
cultural differences (1998, p.157). 
Stam similarly distinguishes between what he calls 
‘the multicultural fact and the multicultural project. 
(.) Multiculturalism as historical fact is as banal as it 
is indisputable’ (1997, p.188).  
This is a particularly important distinction in a New 
Zealand context, where multiculturalism, particularly 
in the urban centers, is clearly an undisputable fact. 
‘As an empirical statement of fact, New Zealand is 
multicultural in that it has a diverse population who 
identify as Maori, Tagata Pasifika, Pakeha, and New 
Zealanders of Asian origins’ (Fleras & Spoonley, 
1999, p.235).  However, it is on the level of ‘official 
multiculturalism’ where the concept is mainly 
contested, for it is here that issues of representation, 
both political and cultural, come to the fore and 
where boundaries are drawn which define the spaces 
in which multiple cultures are allowed or not allowed 
to manouevre. 
Kymlicka makes an important distinction between 
what he calls ‘multination states (where cultural 
diversity arises from the incorporation of previously 
self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into 
a larger state) and polyethnic states (where cultural 
diversity arises from individual and familial 
immigration)’ (1995, p.6). New Zealand can be more 
or less seen as a combination of these two 
descriptions. Discourses about multiculturalism and 
biculturalism often ignore this distinction, which 
results in seeing multiculturalism and biculturalism as 
bipolar opposites that rule each other out. Following 
from this line of thinking is the often stated idea that 
‘multiculturalism must wait its turn’. But Kymlicka’s 
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distinction makes clear that the objectives of both 
are very different.  
In relation to ‘multination’ states, ‘national 
minorities typically wish to maintain themselves as 
distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and 
demand various forms of autonomy or self-
government to ensure their survival as distinct 
societies’ (1995, p.10). In a general sense, this has 
resulted in the bicultural framework in New 
Zealand in response to the ‘Maori Renaissance’. By 
contrast, in ‘polyethnic’ states, ‘cultural diversity 
arises from individual and familial immigration. 
Such immigrants often coalesce into loose 
associations which I call “ethnic groups”. They 
typically wish to integrate into the larger society, 
and to be full members of it. (.) Their aim is not to 
become a separate and self-governing nation 
alongside the larger society, but to modify the 
institutions and laws of the mainstream society to 
make them more accommodating of cultural 
differences’ (ibid, p.10/11). This relates directly to 
Champagne’s distinction between civil rights and 
indigenous rights (2004). Where indigenous rights 
are focused on group rights (self-determination and 
autonomy), civil rights are mostly about individual 
rights to self-fulfilment, and Champagne rightly 
argues that the civil rights framework does not fit 
with indigenous rights. In short, while discourses of 
biculturalism are mostly framed in terms of 
indigenous rights (at least from a Maori position), 
discourses of multiculturalism tend to be framed in 
terms of civil rights. It is precisely the failure to 
make this important distinction clear that frames the 
debates in a New Zealand context, and allows the 
government to appropriate either discourse in 
opportune ways.  
Debates about biculturalism and multiculturalism 
in New Zealand are often framed in an either/or 
fashion, and within this framework, New Zealand 
has made a ‘choice’ to pursue biculturalism as a 
state policy, at least in official terms. Since the 
above mentioned Maori Renaissance, the Treaty of 
Waitangi has occupied a central place in this 
official policy. As Pratt asserts, ‘the Treaty of 
Waitangi cemented into New Zealand culture and 
political life the idea that relations between Maori 
and Pakeha- colonisers and colonised- should be 
conducted on the basis of a ‘partnership of equals’ 
(1999, p.316).   
It is the ‘choice’ element that makes this idea 
problematic in that it is prescriptive and hence 
ideological in nature. For a start, it raises the 
question of who made this ‘choice’ and for whose 
benefit? And who gets excluded as a result of this 
‘choice? ‘A prescriptive rather than descriptive 
definition, official biculturalism in New Zealand 
marginalises ethnic minority groups who do not see 
themselves represented under the umbrella term 
“Pakeha”, while at the same time presupposing a 
homogeneous “British” culture as the binary 
opposite to Maori’ (Nola, 2000, p.207, see also 
Mohanram, 1998, Ip, 1998). In other words, 
biculturalism excludes important sections of New 
Zealand society, at least in official discourses.  
It is precisely this underlying binary structure that 
leads for example Thakur to the following 
conclusion: ‘The debate in New Zealand is about 
biculturalism, not multiculturalism: the two are 
mutually exclusive. The Maori are the oldest 
immigrants to New Zealand, and Pakeha the second 
oldest. Groups which are neither Maori nor European 
are frozen out of the debate on the identity and future 
of the country and disenfranchised with respect to the 
politics of multiculturalism. They are rendered 
impotent in setting the agenda of the debate or 
defining its conceptual vocabulary’ (1995, 
p.271/272). This raises a number of issues.  
Firstly, it draws attention to a temporal hierarchy 
which biculturalism establishes. This hierarchy 
ultimately tends to lead to a situation where 
‘biculturalism is seen as the central platform from 
which a future multicultural society will be launched. 
The argument goes like this: in order to develop a 
model of ethnic relations that can answer to the 
democratic demands of a whole range of minority 
groups, it will first be necessary to develop 
representational structures that will empower the 
largest minority group’ (Maxwell, 1998, p.199). It is 
in the reaction to this argument that the confusion 
between the different ‘culturalisms’ as official policy 
and everyday experience becomes clear.  
Consider for instance the following statement by 
Rajen Prasad (former Race Relations Conciliator): ‘I 
don’t think it’s as simple as saying, “First achieve 
biculturalism, then we’ll look at multiculturalism”. 
One can’t wait for the other’ (quoted in Nola, 2000, 
p.207). Indeed, everyday multiculturalism does not 
wait, but official multiculturalism is a political 
project and it is therefore possible to put this project 
on hold, or to ‘silence’ it in mainstream discourse. 
The effect of this is that some groups are constructed 
as ‘late comers’, or in Bhabha’s words, ‘by being 
“after” the original [Pakeha and Maori], or in 
“addition to” it, gives it the advantage of introducing 
a sense of “secondariness” or belatedness into the 
structure of the original’ (1990, p.305). 
Another aspect of Thakur’s critique of biculturalism 
is the idea that Maori are the first in a long line of 
immigrant groups. This is problematic because it 
denies Maori special status on the basis of indigenous 
rights, and it ironically mirrors a common Pakeha 
discourse that constructs settlers as ‘simply extending 
an ancient line of voyaging and settling rather than 
interrupting, as colonizers, an established world’ 
(Williams, 1997, p.25). And as Fleras & Spoonley 
argue, ‘unlike voluntary immigrants, indigenous 
peoples such as Maori did not voluntarily consent to 
be ruled or dominated. Nor did they expect to have 
language and culture eroded because of colonialism 
or assimilation’ (1999, p.246). Of course the 
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‘voluntary’ aspect here is a matter of degree and is 
not always as straightforward as they imply here, 
but it does draw attention to differences between 
‘indigenous’ and ‘multicultural’ positions.  
Whereas a ‘multicultural’ position argues that 
biculturalism is too limiting, and not inclusive 
enough, an ‘indigenous’ position is often based on 
the idea that biculturalism does not go far enough in 
terms of its inherent promise of power sharing. 
Mohanram draws attention to this power aspect 
when she writes that, ‘the concept of equitable 
power-sharing, so desirable for both Maori and 
Pakeha, is ultimately revealed to be something that 
can be initiated only by Pakeha, because it is 
Pakeha who control the resources’ (1998, p.26). 
Because both ‘culturalisms’ in their official guises 
can be seen as prescriptive ideologies, they can, in 
practice, often be seen as strategies to ‘manage 
diversity’.  
As Pearson argues, ‘such ideologies preserve 
fundamental power differentials by masking class 
(and gender) divisions with a gloss of “ethnic 
difference”. Ethnic communities, real or imagined 
and their “leaders”, are co-opted into the state and 
polity and are encouraged to view themselves as 
part of nations that are, in reality, still dominated by 
the monocultural core values and practices of their 
ruling classes’ (1996, p.249, see also Stratton, 
1998). ‘Ethnic difference’ refers here to culture in 
the narrow and material sense of the word. In 
relation to biculturalism for instance, Walker 
identifies this slippage and argues that there are two 
versions of biculturalism: ‘The Pakeha version, 
which means learning a few phrases of Maori 
language and how to behave on the marae, and the 
Maori version, which entails Pakehas sharing what 
they have monopolised for so long, power, 
privilege and occupational security’ (quoted in 
Maxwell, 1998, p.198).  
In other words, if ‘culturalisms’ are seen in this 
narrow sense, the issue of power becomes elided 
from the equation. Mohanram indicates how this is 
beneficial from a Pakeha point of view. 
‘Commonsense or popular understanding of this 
term bicultural suggests that it is the Pakeha who 
initiates and deploys power-sharing in order “to do 
the right thing”. In their bicultural relationship with 
Maori, Pakeha are transformed into democratic, 
liberal, generous, culturally sensitive citizens’ 
(1998, p.26). The way in which institutions like the 
New Zealand Film Commission operate 
exemplifies this relationship on a day-to-day basis. 
To argue that biculturalism and multiculturalism 
are incompatible and cancel each other out is to 
accentuate their differences and to ignore their 
similarities. To some extent, both these positions 
are attacking Eurocentrism, albeit for different 
reasons. From a multicultural position, the aim is to 
‘graft bits of diversity onto a mainstream core’ 
(Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p.246). In other words, it 
is aimed at creating a space to firstly recognise and 
respect cultural diversity, and secondly to incorporate 
this diversity into mainstream society and culture. 
This is what Charles Taylor has called ‘the politics of 
recognition’ (1992/1994).  
In short, it is aimed at inclusion where there is 
perceived exclusion. And inclusion here does not 
mean assimilation. On the contrary, by stressing 
diversity, this aim contains an implicit critique of 
assimilationist policies and attitudes. According to 
Mfodwo for example, ‘the current spectrum of ethnic 
identities in New Zealand cannot be assimilated into 
various forms of subordinated Anglo-centric identity 
that have hitherto been the dominant modes of 
diversity management in New Zealand. There are 
currently too many non-European “others” in New 
Zealand who cannot be made over into some 
manageable version of Englishness’ (1997, p.100). 
From a multicultural position then, the aim is not in 
the first instance to overthrow the existing political 
structure, but rather to modify it.  
From an indigenous position however, the aim is 
not so much to be incorporated into an existing 
political structure, but rather to reconfigure that 
structure and create a position of power from which 
to define the structure. This does not just apply to 
politics proper, but also to institutions throughout 
society. Because of these different aims, and because 
they are often used in overlapping and confusing 
ways, Fleras and Spoonley propose a new term, ‘bi-
nationalism’, which draws on Kymlicka’s distinction 
between ‘multination’ and ‘polyethnic’. This is 
interesting because it recognises the possibility of 
simultaneity of both these projects, as opposed to a 
‘one first, then the other’ argument which I believe is 
ultimately unsustainable. They propose a 
‘multiculturalism within a bi-national framework’ 
(ibid, p.248). I believe this distinction is helpful 
because it recognises both the similarities between 
multiculturalism and biculturalism as well as the 
differences, and it allows for a potential open-
endedness of the outcome. 
I say ‘potential’ because that depends for a large 
part on how such a social-political objective gets 
defined and by whom. The main reservation about 
Kymlicka’s thesis relates to the perception that it is 
too monocultural, which similarly applies to Fleras & 
Spoonley’s model. It leads to a kind of mosaic of 
‘fenced-in’ cultures, with the dominant culture, as 
largest piece, firmly in the center. As Stratton argues, 
‘the policy of multiculturalism is organised according 
to a metaphorical spatial structure in which migrant, 
‘ethnic’ cultures are peripheral to the core culture’ 
(1998, p.10). This underlying essentialist and often 
narrow notion of culture makes it problematic and 
leaves it open to a frequent slippage between culture 
and race.  
This also makes it vulnerable to various critiques. 
These critiques ‘share a conception of a “culture” as a 
discrete and integrated entity, and a belief that certain 
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cultures are less compatible than others. (.) The 
consequence of this line of thinking is that certain 
cultural groups, usually marked by visual racial 
signifiers, are more acceptable within Australian 
society than others’ (ibid, p.14). This is part of 
Stratton’s analysis of the Pauline Hanson 
phenomenon in Australia, but it has been a common 
discourse in New Zealand as well. The underlying 
logic is that ‘certain cultures are incompatible and 
that this incompatibility threatens the claimed unity 
of the Australian national culture. Race then 
becomes a marker of that cultural difference’ (ibid, 
p.64).  
Ranginui Walker’s (Professor Emeritus at The 
University of Auckland, and frequent commentator 
on ‘Maori issues’ in the mainstream media) critique 
of multiculturalism is a good example of this 
slippage. What starts off as a critique of 
multiculturalism as a perceived threat to 
biculturalism, quickly turns into a process of 
selection where some ‘cultures’ are seen as more 
desirable than others. He begins with the earlier 
mentioned idea that ‘multicultural ideology is a 
direct negation of the Maori assertion of the 
primacy of biculturalism’ (1995, p.286). This is 
followed by a critique of immigration policy as 
purely based on economic considerations under the 
guise of a liberal rejection of racial factors in 
immigration policy. This position appears to have a 
considerable amount of traction in the New Zealand 
context, which becomes clear when we look at New 
Zealand cinema. 
Focus on New Zealand Cinema 
In terms of the ethnic composition of its population, 
New Zealand is clearly a multicultural nation. 
However, this is rarely reflected in its national 
cinema, which largely operates within a bicultural 
framework. The film Broken English (1996, Gregor 
Nicholas) is an important exception to this, in that it 
deliberately sets out to represent a multicultural 
New Zealand. But in hindsight, the film has proven 
to be an exception to the bicultural rule, of which 
Once Were Warriors (1994, Lee Tamahori) and 
Whale Rider (2003, Nikki Caro) are clear examples. 
But even then, the film represents a Pakeha 
perspective on multiculturalism where otherness is 
clearly defined against a Pakeha yardstick.  
The production personnel of Broken English 
consisted mostly of Pakeha New Zealanders, while 
the film features virtually no Pakeha characters. 
This raises issues of power and representation. In 
other words, who has the power to define who, and 
for whose benefit? Although Broken English 
represents a number of different ethnic 
communities in New Zealand (Croatian, Maori, 
Chinese and Cook Island), these communities are 
ultimately not represented by and for themselves, 
but rather on someone else’s terms. In addition, 
these representations are mostly directed at a 
mainstream (and thus largely Pakeha) audience. This 
situation may easily lead to ‘exotic othering’, and 
while the film does this to a certain extent, it is also 
ambiguous in this respect. When quizzed about this, 
director Gregor Nicholas argued that he did not want 
to treat these communities with ‘kid gloves’. 
However, this in turn leads, in the absence of Pakeha 
characters, to a situation where these communities are 
positioned to some extent as a ‘social problem’ (as 
carrying ‘baggage’ into New Zealand), literally 
removed from mainstream society. Within this 
cinematic ‘ethnoscape’, the film displays an 
extraordinary concern with ‘cultural detail’ (such as 
food rituals, dance and colourful clothing), which 
ultimately leads to representations which rarely move 
beyond well-entrenched stereotypes.  
Within the overall context of New Zealand cinema, 
Broken English can be seen as an important text and 
as part of a postcolonial negotiation of nationhood 
and national identity. The problematic ways in which 
it engages with its subject matter serve to illustrate 
the complex nature of such negotiations. The film 
presents a version of New Zealand which is culturally 
and ethnically diverse. In this way, it moves away 
from hegemonic versions of New Zealand which are 
still to a large extent framed in either monocultural or 
bicultural terms. In part, this can be seen as a direct 
result of relatively recent changes in immigration 
policy, which have created an increasingly diverse 
population, particularly in Auckland where the film 
makers are based and where the film’s story takes 
place.  
On one level then, Broken English can be seen as an 
important attempt to bring different minority groups 
into the mainstream, and thus represents an inclusive 
version of the nation. However, the problematic ways 
in which it does so, again illustrates the complexities 
involved in such a project. Although partly due to the 
constraints of film as a medium, and the resultant 
pressures of presenting complex subject matter in 
approximately one and a half hours, the film 
ultimately positions the different ethnic groups it 
represents outside of the mainstream. The fact that it 
is one of the only circulating cinematic versions of 
New Zealand nationhood which engages with ethnic 
and cultural diversity, only accentuates this.  
In terms of future challenges then, I would argue 
for the importance of wider access to the means of 
representation. This is not to say that Pakeha film 
makers cannot make films about other ethnic groups, 
nor that only members of a particular ethnic group 
can adequately represent that group, for this is an 
argument that ultimately leads to essentialist notions 
of culture and identity. It is merely to argue for an 
expansion of the channels through which national and 
cultural identities can be constructed, and to make 
them more inclusive. This would put more emphasis 
on power sharing and dialogue between different 
social groups that make up a New Zealand in 
transition to a postcolonial nation.  
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Conclusions  
The apparent lack of cinematic diversity in New 
Zealand can be seen as a result of the dominant and 
institutionalised discourse of biculturalism in the 
New Zealand context, which not only sees diversity 
primarily in bicultural terms, but also as existing in 
opposition to multiculturalism. I would argue that 
the framing of the debate in these terms, serves to 
perpetuate the dominant position of Pakeha in New 
Zealand power relations. ‘One line of argument is 
that New Zealand remains a monocultural society, 
in outcome if not intent. The ground rules of 
society are inescapably rooted in Eurocentric values 
and structures; the game plan is unmistakably tilted 
towards perpetuating Pakeha power and culture’ 
(Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p.235). The main 
problem in the present debates about biculturalism 
and multiculturalism is that it allows Pakeha as the 
dominant group to have it both ways. On the one 
hand, the discourse of multiculturalism can be 
appropriated to negate indigenous rights by 
positioning Maori as ‘just another ethnic group’, 
while the discourse of biculturalism on the other hand 
can be appropriated to negate civil rights by 
positioning all other groups as ‘late comers’. 
Recognising the important distinction between civil 
rights and indigenous rights would provide much 
needed clarity and focus to the present debate, and 
would allow for the possibility that multiculturalism 
and biculturalism can exist in conjunction rather than 
in opposition. This would be a far more inclusive and 
productive way to position New Zealand in a global 
context.
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